Motivated by Internet targeted advertising, we address several ad allocation problems. Prior work has established these problems admit no randomized online algorithm better than (1− 1 e )-competitive ([Karp et al. 1990; Mehta et al. 2007] ), yet simple heuristics have been observed to perform much better in practice. We explain this phenomenon by studying a generalization of the bounded-degree inputs considered by [Buchbinder et al. 2007 ], graphs which we call (k, d) − bounded. In such graphs the maximal degree on the online side is at most d and the minimal degree on the offline side is at least k. We prove that for such graphs, these problems' natural greedy algorithms attain competitive ratio 1 − d−1 k+d−1 , tending to one as d/k tends to zero. We prove this bound is tight for these algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
Internet advertising is ubiquitous. Forecast to surpass the 50 billion dollar/year mark in 2015 in the United States alone, it has become, to a large extent, the driving economic force behind much of the content of the world wide web. How is this advertising space sold and bought? Most ads fall either under sponsored search or targeted advertising, both of which are sold in what constitute instances of the online ad allocation problem.
In online ad allocation, we are faced with the following problem: advertisers announce to an advertising platform (e.g. Yahoo, Google, Microsoft) what their advertising budgets are, and their bids for an ad to be displayed to every kind of user. The user "type" is determined, for example, by search terms searched, in the case of sponsored search, or user-demographics, in the case of targeted advertising. When a user visits a web-page with an ad slot managed by the ad platform, the latter needs to decide immediately and irrevocably which (if any) of the advertisers' ads to display to the user. The advertising platform's goal is to maximize its revenues, despite uncertainty concerning future page-views. This problem can be formulated as a generalization of online bipartite matching, with advertisers as the offline vertices and ad slots as online vertices. 1 See Section 2 for a formal definition of this and other problems we consider.
The theoretical interest in online allocations can be traced back to 1990, when [Karp et al. 1990 ] considered the fundamental problem of bipartite maximum matching in an online setting. In their seminal paper, Karp et al. proved that randomized online algorithms cannot in general achieve competitive ratio above 1 − 1 e ≈ 0.632, and presented the RANKING algorithm, which matches this upper bound and is thus optimal. 2 The online maximum matching problem was generalized, first by [Kalyanasundaram and Pruhs 2000] , and later by [Aggarwal et al. 2011] , who presented algorithms achieving optimal 1 − 1 e competitive ratio for the b-matching and vertex-weighted matching problems, respectively. The AdWords problem, first proposed by [Mehta et al. 2007] , is the more general ad allocation problem, but subject to the realistic small bid assumption, i.e. assuming every advertiser i has budget B i much larger than its bids b ij . (This assumption is necessary to achieve non-trivial results. See 6.4). For this problem too the natural greedy algorithm has competitive ratio 1 2 . Mehta et al. gave an algorithm for this problem with competitive ratio 1 − 1 e . [Buchbinder et al. 2007 ] achieved the same results using an online primal-dual approach. See [Mehta 2012 ] for an in-depth survey of prior art and techniques used to tackle these problems.
We will address the problems discussed above, but first, we start with motivation.
Motivation
As is to be expected of a problem for which a loss of 1/e ≈ 36.7% can translate itself to billions of dollars in potential revenue lost yearly, researchers have studied weaker models than the adversarial model for the ad allocation problem, in the hope that these may permit better guarantees. (See 1.4.) In this paper we revisit the stronger adversarial model, for graphs with structural characteristics met by many ad allocation instances arising from targeted advertising. Specifically, we assume advertisers are interested in a large number of ad slots (at least k), and that every ad slot is of interest to a relatively small number of advertisers (at most d). As with the small bid assumption B i b ij for the AdWords problem, assumption of the above structure is not only useful in order to obtain better bounds (as we will show), but also constitutes a reasonable assumption for targeted advertising, for the following twin reasons: online side: advertisers typically target their advertising campaigns at specific segments of the population (e.g. young Californians who ski often); while these segments may be large in absolute terms, they are mostly small in relative terms (e.g., less than four percent of Californians ski often). Consequently, users tend to belong to relatively few segments. Coupled with the fact that the number of active campaigns at any given time is limited, this implies a restricted pool of ads that might be displayed to any particular user, justifying the small degree assumption for ad slots. offline side: advertisers typically target large segments of the population (as in the example above), while not allocating a budget high enough to display ads to all users in a segment. Coupled with the fact that every page-view of a particular targeted user corresponds to a vertex in the graph, this implies the high degree assumption on the offline side, and more generally for the ad allocation problem, the assumption that i,j b ij ≥ k · B i for some large k.
1 In this paper, without loss of generality, we assume advertisers only pay for impressions, and not e.g. clicks.
2 The original proof of RANKING's competitive ratio was found to contain a mistake nearly twenty years later by Krohn and Varadarajan, but the algorithm's performance has since been re-proven by [Birnbaum and Mathieu 2008] , [Goel and Mehta 2008] , and recently by [Devanur et al. 2013 ].
We call the graphs displaying these characteristics (k, d)-bounded graphs. Definition 1.1 ((k, d)-bounded graphs). We say a bipartite graph G = (L, R, E) is (k, d)bounded if every left vertex i ∈ L has degree d(i) ≥ k and every right vertex j ∈ R has degree d(j) ≤ d. For ad allocations, we replace
We concern ourselves with such graphs with k large and d small. For brevity's sake, as all graphs in this paper will be bipartite, we refrain from stating the fact explicitly, and refer to (k, d)-bounded graphs as (k, d)-graphs henceforth. As the problems studied in this paper are all maximization problems, we adopt the convention that a lower bound indicates a positive result and an upper bound indicates a negative result.
Our Results
By focusing on (k, d)-graphs, we justify the observed success of greedy algorithms "in the wild", and propose algorithms that are exponentially better, and provably optimal under these structural assumptions. Finally, we leverage our deterministic algorithms to prove simple randomized algorithms achieve the same bounds in expectation. Our results hold for the maximum matching, vertex-weighted matching and AdWords problems (with the exception of the matching upper bound for the latter). Table 1 .2 delineates our results for these problems on (k, d)−graphs. We obtain similar results for the general ad allocation problem, even with large-ish bids (see 1.5.) Table I . Best results for general and (k, d)-graphs
Algorithms
General Graphs (k, d)−Graphs
This work can be achieved deterministically for AdWords.
We begin by explaining the empirical success of greedy algorithms for the above problems, proving their loss is proportional to the ratio of the maximal degree in the online side to the minimal degree in the offline side; i.e., their competitive ratio tends to one as this ratio tends to zero. We complement this lower bound with a family of examples for which these algorithms do no better. Theorem 1.2. Greedy algorithms achieve a competitive ratio of k k+d−1 on (k, d)bounded graphs. This analysis is tight for all k ≥ d − 1.
We improve on the above, designing deterministic algorithms with exponentially smaller loss. We prove this is optimal for deterministic algorithms. Theorem 1.3. There exist deterministic online algorithms for the unweighted and vertex-weighted matching problems with competitive ratio
on (k, d)-bounded graphs. Moreover, these algorithms gain at least a 1 − (1 − 1 d ) k fraction of the total sum of weights. This is optimal whenever k ≥ d. Corollary 1.4. (Structural Corollary) For every bipartite graph G with the minimal degree of its left side at least ln c times larger than the maximal degree of its right side, G has a matching with at least a (1 − 1 c )-fraction of G's left side matched.
In stating our bounds for general ad allocation, we follow the notation of [Buchbinder et al. 2007 ] and denote the maximum bid-to-budget ratio by R max = max (i,j)∈E bij Bi . Theorem 1.5. There exists a deterministic algorithm which gains total revenue at least
competitive. This is optimal -no deterministic algorithm can do better for k ≥ d.
To contrast our results with the state-of-the-art, we note that the algorithms of [Mehta et al. 2007; Buchbinder et al. 2007; Devanur et al. 2013 ] achieve competitive ratio (1 − R max ) · 1 − 1/ 1 + R max 1/Rmax . This bound tends to 1 − 1 e from below as R max tends to zero, but is far from this value for larger R max . Our algorithms fare better whenever k ≥ d even for large-ish R max . As stated in 1.1, we expect k to be significantly larger than d, but in order to emphasize the strength of our bound, let us assume only that d/k = R max . Table II displays the resulting competitive ratios in this case. Note that in this regime our algorithm is already better at R max = 1 3 than prior algorithms are at the limit (i.e. when R max → 0). Better still, our algorithms are robust to a few outlying advertisers increasing R max , as the ( i B i ) · (1 − R max ) term in the above bound is rather i B i − max j∈N (i) b ij . This is the first such result in the adversarial setting. To the best of our knowledge only the algorithm of [Devanur et al. 2012 ] for the iid model holds this desired property. Likewise, our algorithms are robust to few outlying advertisers making the input not (k, d)-bounded (alternatively, increasing k), as the following theorem asserts. Theorem 1.6 (Outliers). If every advertiser i satisfies j b ij ≥ k ·B i , except for a subset S ⊂ L with total budget at most an α-fraction of the total sum of budgets, i∈S B i ≤ α · i∈L B i , then the algorithms of Theorems 1.3 and 1.5 gain revenue at least (1−α) times the bounds guaranteed by the above theorems. In particular, these algorithms achieve competitive ratio at least
Finally, we prove that several easy-to-implement randomized algorithms match the bounds of our optimal deterministic algorithms in expectation, despite making no use of the input's structure.
Theorem 1.7. Several simple randomized algorithms achieve expected competitive ratio matching those of Theorems 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6.
Techniques
As many previous ad allocation algorithms, our algorithms can be seen as bid-scaling algorithms. That is, matches are chosen greedily based on the bids b ij of each advertiser i, times a scaling factor. However, contrary to previous algorithms [Mehta et al. 2007; Buchbinder et al. 2007; Devanur et al. 2013 ] that scale bids according to the function 1 − e f (i)−1 , where f (i) is the fraction of i's budget spent so far, our algorithms essentially scale bids according to an exponential in u, the number of unused opportunities for spending the current bid b ij , specifically, d d−1 u . Other differences can be seen in our algorithms' primal-dual interpretation: we make no use of the ad slots' dual variables, and only update the dual variables of each arriving ad slot's neighbors. Interestingly, our online primal-dual algorithms do not guarantee dual feasibility throughout their execution, but only upon termination. To the best of our knowledge, ours are the first online primal-dual algorithms with this behavior.
The above approach works directly for vertex-weighted matching. To generalize our approach to ad allocations, we first consider an intermediary problem -equal-bids ad allocation -where every advertiser i bids the same bid b i for all neighbors j ∈ N (i). We reduce this problem in (k, d)-graphs to the vertex-weighted problem in (k, d)-graphs in an online manner. We then rewrite this reduction along with our vertex-weighted online algorithm as a single online primal-dual algorithm for the equal-bids problem. Guided by this algorithm we devise a primal-dual algorithm for general-bids ad allocation on (k, d)-graphs, using a bounded fraction of the advertisers' dual variables to guide our choice of matches and dual updates. This allows us to simulate the bidscaling described above also in the case where each advertiser has different bids.
Finally, our randomized results stem from our deterministic primal-dual algorithms, whose dual updates we use in our dual-fitting analysis of the randomized algorithms. Dual feasibility follows as it does for our algorithms. The dual costs are bounded in expectation by the primal cost times the required constant, conditioned over the random algorithm's previous choices. Taking total expectation over the possible previous choices yields the expected competitive ratio.
Related Work
Several stochastic models have been studied for the problems we address. Most prominent among these are the random arrival order and i.i.d model with known/unknown distribution. Our algorithms beat all of these bounds in the worst case for sufficiently small d/k and R max , replacing stochastic assumptions by structural ones.
For the random order model a line of work beginning with [Goel and Mehta 2008 ] has shown the optimal competitive ratio for maximum matching lies in the range (0.696, 0.823) [Feldman et al. 2009; Karande et al. 2011; Mahdian and Yan 2011; Manshadi et al. 2012] . For the known distribution model [Feldman et al. 2009 ] were the first to show the optimal competitive ratio is strictly greater than 1 − 1 e and bounded away from 1. Subsequent work [Bahmani and Kapralov 2010; Haeupler et al. 2011; Jaillet and Lu 2013] showed the optimal competitive ratio for bipartite matching in this setting lies in the range (0.706, 0.823), and (0.729, 0.823) if the expected number of arrivals of each ad slot type is integral. For the vertex-weighted problem under the previouslymentioned integrality assumptions [Haeupler et al. 2011] and [Jaillet and Lu 2013] showed a lower bound of 0.667 and 0.725, respectively. For the AdWords problem under the random order model, [Devanur and Hayes 2009] give a (1 − )-competitive algorithm, assuming the online side's size is known in advance and no bid is higher than roughly 3 /|L| 2 times the optimum value. [Devanur et al. 2012] gave an algorithm in the unknown distribution model achieving asymptotically optimal competitive ratio of
. In a different vein, [Mahdian et al. 2007 ] considered the AdWords problem given black-box estimates of the input. They show how to obtain performance trading-off between the worst-case optimal and the black-box's performance on the given input. We require no such algorithm be available, but rather rely on domain-specific structure.
Closer to our work, [Buchbinder et al. 2007 ] considered (1, d)-graphs for equal-bids ad allocation. We obtain more general results, and strictly better bounds for all k > d.
Paper Outline
In Section 2 we formally define the problems considered throughout the paper. In Section 3 we give a tight analysis of algorithm GREEDY in (k, d)-graphs. In Section 4 we build on the hard examples of Section 3 and present optimal algorithms for the online maximum matching and vertex-weighted matching problems in (k, d)-graphs. In Section 5 we extend these results to the general ad allocation problem. In Section 6 we present hardness results for the problems considered. In Section 7 we extend our analysis to prove competitiveness of several simple randomized algorithms. We conclude with a discussion of future work and open questions in Section 8.
PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
An instance of the ad allocation problem consists of a bipartite graph G = (L, R, E). The left-hand L side corresponds to advertisers, and the right-hand side R to ad slots. Each advertiser i ∈ L has some budget B i and is willing to bid some value b ij ≤ B i for every neighboring ad slot j ∈ N (i) (the bids of advertiser i need not be equal for all j ∈ N (i)). Each ad slot j ∈ R can be allocated to (up to) one advertiser i, yielding a profit of b ij . The bids for ad slots allocated to an advertiser i may not exceed i's budget, B i . Figure 1 presents the ad allocation problem's LP relaxation and its dual. An instance of the online ad allocation problem consists of an ad allocation instance; the advertisers given up-front, along with their budgets, and the ad slots arriving oneby-one, together with their edges and bids. An online ad allocation algorithm must, upon arrival of an ad slot j, determine to which advertiser (if any) to allocate the ad slot. Allocations are irrevocable, and so must be made to feasible advertisers, whose residual budget is sufficient to pay their actual bid.
We will consider several interesting special cases of the above problem throughout this paper. These problems are both interesting in their own right (theoretically as well as practically), in addition to providing some insight towards achieving a solution to the general problem.
The equal-bids online ad allocation problem is the above problem with each advertiser i bidding the same value for all neighboring ad slots; i.e., b ij = b i for all j ∈ N (i).
The online vertex-weighted matching problem is the above problem with every advertiser i bidding all its budget for every neighboring ad slot; i.e., b ij = B i for all j ∈ N (i).
The online maximum matching problem is the above problem with all budgets and bids equal to 1; i.e., b ij = B i = 1 for all j ∈ N (i).
WARM-UP: GREEDINESS IN (K, D)-GRAPHS
In this section we show that the natural greedy algorithms for the problems considered, which in general graphs are only 1/2-competitive, achieve on (k, d)-graphs a competitive ratio tending to one as d/k tends to zero. We prove this result by applying dual-fitting, and prove our analysis is tight.
Algorithm GREEDY for the online ad allocation problem matches an ad slot j ∈ R to a feasible neighbor i with highest bid b ij . For the vertex-weighted case, where b ij = B i for all j ∈ N (i), this reduces to picking an unmatched neighbor of highest weight. Our analysis relies on a dual-fitting formulation, given in Algorithm 1 below.
Algorithm 1 AD ALLOCATION GREEDY (Dual-Fitting Formulation) 1: Init: set z i ← 0 for all i ∈ L 2: for all j ∈ R do 3:
if j has a feasible neighbor then 4: match j to a feasible neighbor maximizing b ij 5:
if i's residual budget is less than R max · B i then 10: set z i ← 1 Theorem 3.1. Algorithm GREEDY is k k+d−1 -competitive for the unweighted, vertexweighted maximum matching and equal-bids ad allocation problems on (k, d)-graphs.
Proof. We prove the following claims: 
Claim (a):
For every advertiser i ∈ L, if over a (1 − R max )-fraction of i's budget is spent then z i is set to one in Line 10. Otherwise, i is a feasible match of all of its neighbors j, each such j causing z i to increase by at least bij k·Bi . As j b ij ≥ k · B i then z i = 1 by the algorithm's termination. Consequently, all dual inequalities are satisfied.
Claim (b): For each ad slot j ∈ R, by the choice of j's match i, and the fact that j has degree d(j) at most d, the primal value increases by ∆P = b ij and the dual cost increases by at most
Claim (c):
For an advertiser i ∈ L to have spent over (1 − R max )B i for all but the general problem, it must and have z i set to one. Thus Lines 8-10 incur no dual cost.
Claim (c'): For an advertiser i ∈ L to be affected by Lines 8-10, it must spend up to a (1 − R max )-fraction of its budget. However, whenever i spends an f -fraction of its budget, the dual variable z i increases by f in Line 6, and so the cost of increasing z i in line 10 is at most R max · B i , while i garnered a primal profit of at least (1 − R max ) · B i . The total dual cost of Lines 8-10 is thus at most Rmax 1−Rmax · P , for P the primal profit.
Tight Examples for Algorithm GREEDY
We show that our analysis of algorithm GREEDY for the unweighted and vertexweighted matching is tight whenever k ≥ d − 1 . 3 Theorem 3.3. For all k ≥ d − 1 there exist (k, d)−graphs G with maximal matchings that achieve a competitive ratio no better than k k+d−1 on G. Proof. The tight example, along with a poor choice of matching, is defined as follows: The offline side contains k + d − 1 advertisers. The first k ad slots by order of arrival j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j k each have degree exactly d, with the t-th ad slot j t having as neighbors the t-th advertiser i t (to which it is matched), as well as the last d − 1 advertisers, i k+1 , i k+2 , . . . , i k+d−1 . After the first k ad slots arrive all d − 1 unmatched advertisers have degree exactly k. (By this stage the ad slots and the last d − 1 advertisers form a copy of K k,d−1 . See Figure 2 .) The following ad slots are used to increase the degree of the first k advertisers to at least k, while guaranteeing that the first k advertisers can be simultaneously matched to the last ad slots (for example, by having all the latter ad slots have degree one). The resulting graph is a (k, d)−graph with k of its advertisers matched for which all k + d − 1 advertisers can be matched simultaneously.
For any R max a unit fraction, gluing 1/R max copies of the above tight example at the advertisers, with each advertiser having a budget of 1/R max , yields an equal-bid ad allocation instance and greedy allocation for which the same k k+d−1 performance holds, proving tightness of our analysis for equal-bid allocations. We now state a theorem implying our analysis' tightness for GREEDY in general ad allocations. For the sake of brevity, we defer the theorem's proof to the full version of the paper.
Theorem 3.4. For all k ≥ d − 1 and R max ≤ 1 2 there exist (k, d)−graphs G and greedy allocations achieving a competitive ratio at most (1−Rmax)·k k+(d−1)·(1−Rmax) on G.
OPTIMAL VERTEX-WEIGHTED MATCHING ON (K, D)-GRAPHS
The previous section shows our analysis of GREEDY is tight, though for a particular(ly bad) instantiation of the input, and more importantly of the algorithm. The family of tight examples suggests the following improved algorithm: match every arriving ad slot to an unmatched neighbor of highest degree. This algorithm, which we call HIGH-DEGREE, is given below. The intuition behind it, substantiated by the above examples, is that unmatched advertisers with higher degree may have fewer chances to be matched later. This approach fares better on the above examples (actually yielding an optimal solution), but can it do better than GREEDY for all (k, d)−graphs? We answer this question in the affirmative, proving a lower bound with exponentially smaller loss. In Section 6 we prove a matching lower bound, implying the algorithm's optimality.
Algorithm 2 HIGH-DEGREE
1: for all j ∈ R do 2:
if j has an unmatched neighbor then 3: match j to unmatched neighbor of highest degree.
Analysis of HIGH-DEGREE
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm HIGH-DEGREE is 1−(1− 1 d ) k competitive for all (k, d)−graphs. Corollary 4.2. On d-regular graphs algorithm HIGH-DEGREE is 1−(1− 1 d ) d competitive. This is the first result for maximum online matching in regular graphs in the adversarial setting, beating the 1 − 1 e "barrier" deterministically. Theorem 4.1 can be proven directly (see 4.2), but in order to set the groundwork for proofs of our more general results, we generalize this algorithm and rewrite it as a primal-dual algorithm, below (3). The constant C will be chosen during the analysis. Moreover, it gains revenue at least (1 − 1 − 1 d k ) · i B i . Proof. We rely on the following observation, verifiable by induction: All unmatched advertisers i satisfy z i = C · ( d d−1 d(i) − 1). Hence Algorithm 3 matches each ad slot j to an unmatched neighbor i maximizing b ij · C · ( d d−1 d(i) − 1). For the unweighted problem, b ij = 1. By monotonicity of exponentiation, picking such i is tantamount to picking an advertiser of highest degree. We proceed to bound the algorithm's gain.
Let j ∈ R be some ad slot matched to i. The incurred change to the primal profit equals ∆P = b ij . By our choice of j's match, the change to the dual cost satisfies
Given dual feasibility, the above would imply a competitive ratio of 1/(1 + C). Hence, we choose the minimal C ensuring z i = 1 by the algorithm's end for all advertisers i (matched and unmatched alike). Recall all unmatched advertisers i satisfy z i = C · (( d d−1 ) d(i) − 1). As such i have degree at least k by the algorithm's end (but possibly no higher), the minimal C ensuring z i = 1 is C = 1/(( d d−1 ) k − 1). As the dual solution has z i = 1 for all i by the algorithm's termination, the dual cost is exactly D = i∈L B i . Consequently, the primal gain satisfies P ≥ 1 1+C · i B i . The theorem follows.
The above algorithm implies structural Corollary 1.4 and the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. For (k, d)-graphs with k ≥ d · ln |L|, by integrality of number of vertices matched, HIGH-DEGREE successfully matches all of L, obtaining a maximum matching.
We can extend our analysis to handle the possible existence of outlying advertisers i, that do not satisfy j b ij ≥ k ·B i , and so may not satisfy z i = 1, ruining dual feasibility. Let S ⊆ L be the set of outlying advertisers, and assume i∈S B i ≤ α · i∈L B i . As z i = 1 for all i ∈ S, we have D ≥ (1 − α) · i∈L B i , implying the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5 (Outliers) . Let S ⊆ L be the set of outlying advertisers, and α be such
Potential-based Analysis of HIGH-DEGREE
In this subsection we present a potential-based proof of Theorem 4.1. We note that this proof can easily be extended to provide alternative proofs of Theorems 4.3 and 4.5.
Theorem 4.6. Algorithm HIGH-DEGREE achieves value at least 1 − (1 − 1 d ) k · |L| for all (k, d)−graphs G = (L, R, E), and it is therefore
Proof. Let U L ⊆ L denote the set of unmatched advertisers. Consider the following potential:
. Algorithm HIGH-DEGREE outputs a matching that effectively strives to greedily minimize φ. 4 The initial and final values of the potential function hold φ start = |L| and φ f inal ≥ (d/(d − 1)) k · |U L |, respectively. Denote by ∆φ j the change to φ incurred by the arrival of ad slot j ∈ R. Clearly, if j is unmatched we have ∆φ j = 0. On the other hand, if j is matched to a neighbor i, previously of degree d(i), we find that i's matching results in φ decreasing by (d/(d − 1)) d(i) , and the degree of j's remaining unmatched neighbors increase each cause φ to increase by at most (d/(d − 1)) d(i)+1 −(d/(d − 1)) d(i) . Therefore, if j is matched to i we have
In other words ∆φ j ≤ 0, irrespective of whether or not j is matched. By this fact and our bounds on the initial and final potential, we find that
The theorem follows. 4 The sum of unmatched advertisers' degrees may seem like a more natural potential function to consider, but it turns out that it cannot be used to derive tight bounds. E.g., it does not yield a bound significantly better than 5 8 = 0.625 for k = d.
ONLINE AD ALLOCATION
In this section we solve the ad allocation problem. We consider first the equal-bids case, where each advertiser i offers the same bid for all its neighbors; i.e., b ij = b i ∀j ∈ N (i). This will prove to be a useful stepping-stone towards a solution for general bids, in 5.1. One way to solve equal-bids ad allocation is via an online reduction to vertexweighted matching in (k, d)-graphs. As each advertiser i bids j∈N (i) 
The reduction splits each i into B i /b i copies, each of value b i and receiving up to k distinct edges of i, stopping if the copy is matched. The obtained graph G is (k, d)-bounded (perhaps after adding inconsequential neighbors to matched advertisers), and matchings in G induce allocations of same value for the ad allocation instance. As Algorithm 3 gains 1 − (1 − 1 d ) k of the sum of vertex weights, or equivalently the sum of budgets, applying it yields a 1 − (1 − 1 d ) k competitive solution to the original ad allocation instance. We restate the above as a primal-dual algorithm for equal-bids ad allocation. (See Algorithm 4 below). In this algorithm, z c i serves the role of z i in Algorithm 3 for i's "current copy" (hence the c in the notation), weighted to reflect the copy contributes b i /B i of i's budget. Intuitively, when i is matched we imagine its current copy is matched, and set z c i to b i /B i . Conversely, we ensure that once the copy has k edges z c i = b i /B i . Either way, once z c i = b i /B i , we add z c i to z i and nullify z c i (moving to i's next copy, whose dual variable would be zero in Algorithm 3.) The number of copies of i guarantees dual feasibility and the choice of match and dual updates guarantee the desired bound. for all feasible neighbor of j, i = i do 8:
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm 4 with C = 1/ d d−1 k −1 gains revenue 1 − (1 − 1 d ) k · i B i , and is thus 1 − (1 − 1 d ) k -competitive for the equal-bid problem on (k, d)-graphs. Proof. To bound the primal-dual ratio, we bound increases of z c i · B i , as all dual costs can be traced back to past increases of z c i . Consider some ad slot j matched to i. The primal gain is ∆P = b i , whereas the dual cost satisfies
is the degree of i's current copy, or equivalently, the number of i's edges since z c i was last nullified. Hence, by our choice of C, after at most k i-edges, z c i = bi Bi (whether or not i is matched), and z i is increased by bi Bi . As d(i) ≥ k · Bi bi by the end, z i ≥ 1 for all i. The theorem follows.
General Bids
A natural way to extend Algorithm 4 to general bids would be to replace for every ad slot j and every neighbor i (or i ) all appearances of b i (or b i ) by b ij (resp., b i j ) in the choice of j's match and updates to z c i , z c i and z i . Such dual updates would guarantee, similarly to our prior algorithms, that an advertiser i with budget B i and rejected bids b i0 , b i1 , . . . , b it since its last match (ordered chronologically) would have dual variable
Unfortunately, replacing b i by b ij in the updates for matched i could result in z i arbitrarily small. Worse still, since previously-rejected bids may be greater than the current bid, setting z c i to bij Bi could even decrease z c i , complicating the task of bounding the primal-dual ratio. Algorithm 5 below sidesteps these issues by considering bounded fractions of z c i , and using the following notation, motivated by Equation 1, to represent variables z c i , and z f i (the f in the notation refers to a bounded fraction of z c i "used"). This notation's use will become apparent during the algorithm's analysis.
r . We think of z as a number in base d d−1 , denoting it by z = [b t , . . . , b 1 , b 0 ], disregarding the 1 d−1 · C term for simplicity. Addition and subtraction of numbers in this notation is done place-wise, disallowing carries/borrows. In particular
Comparisons involving numbers in this notation refer to their numerical value.
The algorithm for the general bids setting is Algorithm 5, below. The algorithm's primal feasibility is trivial, as is its dual feasibility, due to Lines 22-23. It remains to bound the ratio of the cost of the dual solution to the value of the primal solution.
High-Level intuition:. The algorithm asserts three invariants. The first guarantees increases in z i are "paid for" by increases in z c i , allowing us to focus on bounding changes to z c i . A second invariant guarantees every increase of z i by some value b/B i can be accredited to previous bids (or fractions thereof) of total value at most k · b/B i . As the graph is (k, d), if every bid of i of value b were to cause z i to increase (by at least b/(k · B i ), by the above), then eventually z i ≥ 1. However, some bids may not incur an increase in z i . The third and last invariant guarantees the total value of fractions of bids that do not cause z i to increase is at most k · R max , and so z i ≥ (1 − R max ) before Lines 22-23. Thus, the cost of rounding each z i to one in these lines is at most R max /(1 − R max ) of the previously-paid dual cost. The bound will follow. The following four lemmas formalize the above, allowing us to derive our sought-after bound.
Lemma 5.3. Before every ad slot's arrival and before Line 22, every z c i is a number in the above numeral system satisfying the following three properties: Lemma 5.6. By Line 22 each i satisfies
Proof. Throughout the algorithm, every edge (i, j) causes the sum of digits of z c i to increase by b ij /B i (again ignoring the 1 d−1 ·C term), unless (i, j) are matched. Moreover, the sum of digits does not decrease due to carries. On the other hand, every increase in z i by b coincides with a decrease in the sum of digits of z c i plus (i,j) matched b ij /B i , of at most k · b, by Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5. Put otherwise, the increase in z i is at least 1/k times the total sum of i's bids so far, minus the sum of digits of z c i . By Lemma 5.3, the sum of digits of z c i by Line 22 cannot exceed k · max j {b ij /B i }. The lemma follows. Given the above we can now prove our main result.
Theorem 5.7. On general-bid ad allocations on (k, d)-graphs with k ≥ d − 1 Algorithm
Proof. Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 imply increases in z i can be traced back to a previous increase in z c i of the same value or higher. We therefore bound increases of z c i · B i in order to bound the total dual cost. For each online j ∈ R, by our choice of match i, the change to the dual cost is at most (1 + C) times the change to the primal value, as in Algorithm 4. However, by Lemma 5.6, by Line 22 each i satisfies
Consequently, we have that before Line 22 the primal value P and dual cost D satisfy
As the primal value is unaffected by Lines 22-23, P above is our algorithm's gain. The competitive ratio follows from OP T ≤ i B i and the definition of R max .
Finally, we note that Lemmas 5.3,5.4,5.5 and 5.6 hold for all advertisers i satisfying j b ij ≥ k · B i , irrespective of outliers who don't hold this property, implying the following.
Theorem 5.8 (Outliers) . Let S ⊆ L be the set of outlying advertisers (advertisers i with j b ij < k · B i ), and α be such that i∈S B i ≤ α · i∈L . Then Algorithm 3 gains at least
6. UPPER BOUNDS
Maximum Matching and Vertex-Weighted Matching
In order to construct hard examples, we start by showing that the optimal matching in (k, d)−graphs matches all the advertisers whenever k ≥ d. Consequently, we find that |Γ(A)| ≥ k d · |A| ≥ |A|, and the lemma follows.
The next round is as the last, but restricted to the previously unmatched advertisers. There are (1 − 1 d ) k/Rmax unmatched advertisers by this phase's termination; these advertisers now satisfy the offline side's constraints for (k, d)-graphs, and receive no more neighbors. All of these advertisers' potential profit is lost. For the matched advertisers we now apply the construction of Lemma 6.4 to guarantee that at most a (1 − R max )fraction of their potential profit in an optimal solution is gained, for a total gain of (1 − R max ) · 1 − 1 − 1 d k/Rmax · |L|. Applying Lemma 6.1 repeatedly we find that there exists an allocation with all advertisers unmatched by algorithm A matched 1/R max times (to neighbors for which they bid R max ), and all advertisers matched by A also exhausting their budgets simultaneously. The theorem follows.
RANDOMIZED ALGORITHMS
By relying on the dual updates of Algorithm 3, we prove competitiveness of algorithm RANDOM, which matches every arriving ad slot to some feasible neighbor. Proof. Consider some maximally-matching algorithm A. 5 We maintain and update a dual solution as in our deterministic Algorithm 3 while choosing matches according to Algorithm A. As observed in the proof of Theorem 4.3, such dual updates guarantee all unmatched advertisers i ∈ L with current degree d(i) satisfy
Consequently, these dual update rules guarantee dual feasibility for any maximallymatching algorithm, including RANDOM, provided C = 1/(( d d−1 ) k − 1). We need only bound the expected ratio between the dual and primal solutions' values.
Consider some ad slot j matched to some i. We recall that in the vertex-weighted matching problem the bid b ij is exactly b ij = B i . Therefore, given the current state (determined by the previous random choices), including the set N F (j) of j's unmatched (feasible) neighbors, j's match is chosen uniformly among N F (j) by RANDOM, and consequently
On the other hand, by the same argument
With the last inequality following from |N F (j)| ≤ |N (j)| ≤ d. Taking total expectation over the possible states, we obtain E[∆D] ≤ (1 + C) · E[∆P ]. The theorem follows.
We note that Theorem 7.1 can also be proved using the potential-based proof of Subsection 4.2, observing that the expected potential change incurred by the processing of every online arrival is non-negative. In addition, in the same way that Theorem 4.3 is extended in Theorem 4.5, we can show that RANDOM is also robust to outliers. We omit the details for brevity. Finally, we show that RANDOM also performs well for the general online ad allocation problem. Proof (sketch). The proof resembles that of Theorem 7.1, relying on Algorithms 4 and 5 respectively for the dual-fitting analysis. Dual feasibility is guaranteed by the dual updates. On the other hand, linearity of expectation implies the expected primal-dual ratio matches that of Algorithms 4 and 5 (for the latter, this requires showing Lemmas 5.3-5.6 all hold in expectation). The claimed bounds follow.
FUTURE WORK AND OPEN QUESTIONS
This paper attempts to give a theoretical explanation of the empirical success of simple heuristic algorithms for online ad allocation in practice and further proposes better algorithms under assumptions that could explain above-mentioned success. The paper further poses several interesting follow-up questions.
Optimality for Adwords. We proved optimality of our algorithms for online maximum and vertex-weighted matching. However, for the general ad allocation problem our lower and upper bounds differ by a factor of 1 − 1 − 1 d k / 1 − 1 − 1 d k/Rmax . For small R max (i.e., the AdWords problem), this discrepancy is large. Can better algorithms be obtained for this problem, or can the upper bounds be tightened (or both)?
Randomization. We are able to prove that a multitude of randomized algorithms, which we do not discuss for the sake of brevity, match our deterministic algorithms' expected competitive on (k, d)-graphs. However, we have no upper bounds on randomized algorithms' performance. We believe that randomization does allow for better results, and have some preliminary results that indicate this is indeed the case.
Stochastic Models. An interesting direction would be to extend our analysis of (k, d)-graphs to stochastic models, in which it seems plausible that even better competitiveness guarantees should be achievable.
